Treatise on the Multidimensional Strategic Defence of Europe

Strategic reflection document for citizens of NATO member countries. - July 2026

Europe currently faces a broad strategic challenge: the need to build a multidimensional defense capability capable of responding to conventional, nuclear, cyber, space, chemical, biological, and artificial intelligence threats, with rapid mobilization, its own vectors, and a scalable industry. This challenge is multidimensional because it manifests itself simultaneously on five mutually reinforcing levels, the sum of which is greater than the sum of its parts.

In the political and governmental sphere, Europe lacks mechanisms for automatic and coordinated decision-making and mobilization among the Member States of the Union and NATO. The unanimity rule turns every defense decision into a negotiation with twenty-seven potential vetoes, generating inertia in high-speed crises and hindering the establishment of mandatory financial and industrial quotas (Council of the European Union, 2022; European Parliament, 2025).

In military and operational terms, land, air, naval, space, and missile defense capabilities are dispersed and not integrated into a coherent command and control architecture. Air and missile defense coverage is not uniform, and the response to low-cost drones and swarms remains insufficient (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2025; Draghi, 2024).

In the strategic and nuclear field, nuclear strike and defense capability is almost exclusively French; there is no European structure of common nuclear delivery systems nor of integrated strategic missile defense. Any step towards "European nuclearization" faces complex political dilemmas and resistance from anti-nuclear states (NATO, 2022; Chatham House, 2026).

In terms of technology and artificial intelligence, capabilities in chemical and bacteriological warfare and military AI are nascent, poorly interoperable, and dependent on external technologies. Europe continues to rely on non-European semiconductors, cloud computing, and AI systems for strategic applications (European Union, 2024; Draghi, 2024).

In financial and industrial terms, the effort, although growing—around €343 billion in the Union in 2024, 57% more than in 2021—is not enough for an immediate and massive expansion without transnational agreements and investments far exceeding current levels. The production of munitions, missiles, and vehicles remains below what is needed for a prolonged war effort, and the industrial base operates one hundred and seventy -eight distinct weapons systems compared to thirty in the United States (European Defence Agency, 2025; Draghi, 2024).

This treaty proposes: a long-term strategic vision for European defense, aligned with the Union's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept 2022; institutionalized mechanisms for political, civil and military mobilization, including an EU-NATO Strategic Mobilization Council and an Integrated European Defence Command; an integrated multi-layered defence architecture – land, air, naval, space, CBRN and cyber – with common operational standards and joint operations centres; guidelines for a shared European nuclear framework, or alternatively, for closer nuclear cooperation with NATO and the United States; and a roadmap for industrialisation and defence financing, with production, investment and immediate scalability targets, based on European defence funds and mandatory investment quotas.